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Abstract 
 This study examines the stock market valuation in terms of expected gains of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) amongst banks that were announced from 1991 to 
2001 in 13 European markets. We classify M&As according to activity, geographic 
specialisation or diversification. A Bivariate GARCH model is used to estimate 
abnormal returns taking beta variability into account. Our results document that there 
is, on average, a positive and significant increase in value for the group of targets' 
banks. Moreover, we find that on average there is a positive and significant market 
reaction for the two types of transactions: cross-product diversification and 
geographic specialisation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, the European banking industry has experienced an 
unprecedented level of consolidation. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have taken 
place at record levels. According to Securities Data Corporation (SDC), in the last 
ten years more than 1 223 M&As1 have occurred in the European market. After 
averaging 15 deals a year up to 1985, European M&As jumped to a new level of 30-
90 deals per year between 1991 and 2001.  
To a large extent, this consolidation is based on a belief that gains can accrue 
through scale and scope economies, cost reduction, increased market power and 
reduced earning volatility. Whether or not M&As involving banks actually achieve 
the expected performance gains is an important question. If consolidation causes an 
increase in the firm's value, then shareholder wealth can be increased. On the other 
hand, if M&As do not lead to the promised positive effect, then consolidation implies 
a less profitable and valuable banking industry. A reading of the literature suggests 
that there is no clear evidence that banking mergers are economically valuable to 
shareholders upon announcement (Hannan and Wolken [1989], Houston and 
Ryngaert [1994]). This setting raises the question of whether all bank M&As have an 
insignificant value effect, or whether it is possible to distinguish the types of M&As 
that lead to significant gains from those that do not add value. 
This study examines the impact of European M&As announcement in terms 
of stock valuation. We perform an event study analysis2 of M&As deals covering 13 
European Union (EU) countries plus the Swiss market. We examine the stock market 
effects of M&As in European banking between January 1991 and May 2001 by 
distinguishing between different types of M&As. Specifically, M&As are classified 
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according to their specialisation or diversification along the dimensions of activity 
and geography3. This approach is useful to explain why the phenomena of bank 
M&A’s occur in light of the fact that they do not increase firm value on average. 
Managers wishing to engage in mergers can justify this choice by the fact that few 
mergers create value. 
 Most of the existing studies on M&As in banking sector concern the US 
market. Although several studies find that the announcement of bank M&As, on 
average, neither creates nor destroys stockholder value (Hannan and Wolken [1989], 
Pilloff and Santomero [1998]), some studies find the announcement of certain types 
of bank M&As do create value. DeLong ([2001a], [2001b]) finds that M&As 
focusing along geographic and activity lines create value upon announcement. 
Concerning the European banking market, the recent work of Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia [2000] is the only study that examines the market valuation of M&As. They 
analyze 54 M&As of European financial services (not just banks) taking place 
between 1988 and 1995 in 13 European banking markets. They find that, on average, 
there is a positive and significant increase in value for the average M&As at the time 
of the deal’s announcement. Moreover, they uncover that there is a positive and 
significant market reaction for the M&As between banks and insurance, for domestic 
transactions.  
Our paper differs from that of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia on three main points. 
Firstly, whereas these authors used data from AMDATA database of Acquisitions 
Monthly, which has been discontinued, the statistical data required for our issue have 
been drawn from SDC M&As database. SDC provides a somewhat more complete 
coverage than AMDATA, particularly with respect to national operations and 
transactions in the financial sector4. Secondly, we analyse M&As that were 
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announced on European markets from January 1991 to May 2001 and our sample 
construction is different. Thirdly, we model abnormal returns according to the 
Bivariate GARCH process to control for time-varying beta volatility instead of using 
the market model, which assumes constant beta. Although the use of the market 
model to estimate the abnormal return has a long standing, a growing body of 
evidence exists which suggests that both individual stock and portfolio betas are 
conditional in that beta varies over time (see Fabozzi and Francis [1978], Bos and 
Newbold [1984]). Explicitly modelling time varying betas avoids the problem of 
fallacious abnormal returns induced by a misspecification of beta's characteristics. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the sample design and 
the data sources on European bank M&As. Section 3 explains how abnormal returns 
are constructed using the Bivariate GARCH scheme and presents the results. Section 
4 shows the probit analysis of deal type and abnormal returns. Section 5 concludes.  
 
II. SAMPLE DESIGN AND DATA SOURCES ON EUROPEAN BANK M&As 
  
The primary data employed in this paper are daily stock returns of European 
banks involved in M&As during the sample period from January 1991 through May 
2001. The daily stock returns are obtained from Datastream International and the list 
of M&As announcements from Thomson Financial Securities Data Company 
database (SDC-M&A). In our paper, the terms merger and acquisition are used 
interchangeably to refer to transactions involving the combination of two 
independent firms to form one or more commonly controlled entities. The distinction 
between a merger and an acquisition is somewhat vague5. A merger is often defined 
as a transaction where one entity is combined with another so that at least one initial 
entity loses its distinct identity. An acquisition is often considered as a transaction 
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where one firm purchases a controlling stake of another firm without combining the 
assets of the firms involved. In our analysis, we include transactions with majority 
interests in order to account for operations that have created a change in capital 
control. Moreover, only completed operations are considered. 
The M&As are classified according to their specialisation or diversification 
along the dimensions of geography and activity6. According to our approach, four 
consolidation scenarios can be obtained for each type of operations: (1) operations 
with specialised activity (SPEC) and geographic focusing (GEOF), noted 
SPEC&GEOF; (2) operations with activity diversification (DIV) and with geographic 
focusing noted DIV& GEOF7; (3) operations with specialisation and with geographic 
European diversification (GEOD) noted SPEC& GEOD; (4) operations with cross-
products diversification and geographic diversification noted DIV& GEOD. Table 1 
presents the sample composition for the 13 European countries considered in our 
analysis. A majority of M&As occurred in France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and 
in United Kingdom. Cross-border M&As (GEOD) are relatively limited and the 
number of domestic transactions with cross-product diversification is approximately 
the same as those with specialisation.  
 
III. ESTIMATING  ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
Event study methodology 
We use event study methodology to estimate abnormal stock market returns. 
Traditionally, the standard market model is used to calculate an abnormal return 
(AR) for firm i on day D. This methodology suffers from the drawback of assuming a 
constant beta over the estimation period. The consequence may be to reject the null 
hypothesis (no abnormal returns) too often due to unspecified beta variability. Here, 
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we employ a methodology developed by Frame & Lastrapes [1998], using a Bivariate 
GARCH that allows for some beta movements, 
 rit = ai1 + ai2 ri t-1 + uit    (1) 
 rm t = am1 + am2 rm t-1 + umt (2) 
 hiit = ci1 + ci2 ui t-12 + ci3 hi t-1 (3) 
 hmmt = cm1 + cm2 um t-12 + cm3 hm t-1 (4) 
 imt im iit mmth c h .h=  (5) 
where rit and rmt are the expected returns on security i and market benchmark 
(Datastream General Market Index). Equations (1) and (2) define the average returns 
on security i and market index. Equations (3) and (4) define the conditional variances 
of rit and rmt. Equation (5) defines the conditional covariance. The optimised log 
likelihood function is: 
Log Lt = – 0.5 Log |Ht| - 0.5 u’t Ht-1 ut  (6) 
where |Ht| is the determinant of the matrix Ht  with  Ht = 
ii t imt
imt mm t
h h
h h
 
 
 
 ,                 
and u’t = [uit, umt]. 
 Equilibrium return ri T+k* of asset i at time T+k of the event window is defined 
as a function of: (i)  the anticipation at time T of beta coefficient, denoted βi T+k ; (ii) 
the observed return on the market at time T+k, rm T+k: 
  ri T+k* = E (ri T+k | IT, rm T+k) = E(ri T+k | IT) + imT k T
mmT k T
E(h | I )
E(h | I )
+
+
 (rm T+k – E(rm T+k | IT))  (7) 
where IT is the information available at time T and imT k T
mmT k T
E(h | I )
E(h | I )
+
+
 is expectation 
about βi T+k at time T. 
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Abnormal return at time T+k is defined as the difference between the 
observed return and the equilibrium return: 
                                  ARi T+k = ri T+k – ri T+k*                                                              (8) 
and cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) on the event window [T+1, T+k] is: 
                     
k
iT k iT j
j 1
CAR AR+ +
=
= ∑                                                              (8’)                         
 
For each security, the model (1) to (5) is estimated on a 300 days pre-event 
window. Then, cumulative abnormal returns are evaluated over different windows 
around the event Day D8: (i) 4 one-tailed ex ante windows: [D – J, D – 1], for J = 7, 
15, 30 and 60 (windows w1 to w4); (ii) 4 one-tailed ex post windows: [D, D + J], for 
J = 7, 15, 30 and 60 (windows w5 to w8); (iii) 4 two-tailed symmetric windows:      
[D – J, D + J], for J = 7, 15, 30 and 60 (windows w9 to w12).  
Firstly, cumulated abnormal returns are evaluated for each of these event 
windows and for each bank i. The null that there is no cumulative abnormal returns 
for the bank i over the entire event window (CARi T+k = 0) is tested alternatively with 
a parametric and a non-parametric test. The parametric statistic is the standardised 
cumulated abnormal return for the bank i on the event window [T+1, T+k] : 
TP1i = iT k
iT k T m
CAR
Var (CAR | I ,{r })
+
+
 ,  
 
where Var(CARi T+k | IT) is such that: 
 
Var(CARi T+k | IT)  = λ12 hii T+1 + λ22 ET hii T+2 + ... + λk2 ET hii T+k + 
 + µ12 hmm T+1 + µ22 ET hmm T+2 + ... + µk2 ET hmm T+k 
- 2 (λ1 µ1 him T+1 + λ2 µ2 ET him T+2 + ... + λk µk ET him T+k) 
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with :  
λk = 1 
λk-s = λk-s+1 + ai2s 
µk = E (βi T+k | IT) 
µk-s = am2 µk-s+1 + E (βi T+k-s | IT) 
E (βi T+k | IT) = T iT k mT k
T mT k
Cov (r , r )
Var r
+ +
+
 
 
Under the null (no abnormal returns), TP1i is asymptotically distributed as a 
standard normal variable. To carry out a non-parametric test, excess returns ARit for 
each bank i are ranked on the whole (estimation + event) window. Let rkit be the 
centred rank of ARit among the different abnormal returns of bank i over this whole 
window. The rkit are then cumulated on the sole M days of the chosen event window. 
The non-parametric statistic test is: 
TNP1i (M,U) = 
M
i U j 1
j 1
2
T J
i t j 1
t J j 1
1 rk
M
1 1 rk
T M 1 M
− +
=
− +
= =
 
 
− +  
∑
∑ ∑
 
where U is the upper bound of event window9 and T is the upper bound of the [1, T] 
estimation window. The right hand side denominator is the standard deviation of the 
cumulated and standardised ranks as evaluated on estimation windows. Under the 
null, TNP1i would be standard normal.  
Secondly, we test the null that there is no abnormal return for the entire bank 
sample and over the entire event window.  
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The statistic used is: 
T2 = 
SCAR
SCAR
s
 = 
( )
N
i U
i 1
2N
i U
i 1
1 SCAR
N
1 SCAR SCAR
N (N 1)
=
=
−
−
∑
∑
 
where N is the number of banks in the sample, SCARiU is the standardised 
cumulative abnormal return for bank i at the upper bound U of the event window and 
SCAR  is the cross section mean of the different SCARiU. Under the null T2 is 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variable. 
 
Results 
Whole results are not reported here. Table 2 resumes T2 values using various 
windows and sampling M&As' according to: (i) the status of the entity, target or 
bidder; (ii) the geographic dimension, with a same or a different geographic area for 
the two entities; (iii) the activity dimension, with a cross-product diversification or a 
specialisation. These statistics are presented for both event windows [-7, +7] and      
[-15, +15]10. According to T2 statistic values, cumulative abnormal returns are 
positive and significant for the whole sample. Thus, as a whole, European M&As in 
banking industry lead to significant increase in overall value. This result is not 
consistent with the findings of most event studies carried out for the U.S. banking 
market. Although, TP1 and TNP1 statistics show that less than 10% of the deals 
present, individually, a significant abnormal return. Thus the market expects a value 
effect only for few M&As.  
The various sampling allows us to look at whether the market makes a 
distinction in the type of deal. Firstly, the tests show a positive and statistically 
significant abnormal return for the target group. Thus, M&As may be motivated by 
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the desire to replace inefficient management and to improve X-efficiency. This result 
is consistent with the finding of Houston and Ryngaert [1994] and DeLong ([2001a], 
[2001b]) for American banks, and Cybo-Ottone and Murgia [2000] for European 
banks. Secondly, our results show that the market reacts positively to M&As with 
geographic specialisation, suggesting that the market expects benefits such as 
reduced costs. Another interpretation of this result is that such M&As could be 
expected to take advantage of market power. By focusing on a particular market, 
merging banks could take advantage of monopolistic or oligopolistic rents. Our 
finding is consistent with this of Delong ([2001a], [2001b]) and Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia [2000].  
Thirdly, the cross-products diversification deals capture positive expectations 
from the market. This result suggests that scope economies and/or a positive effect of 
the risk diversification are expected when a bank is engaged in multiple products 
activity. Note that these results are different from those obtained on American banks. 
Delong ([2001a], [2001b]) shows evidence that the market reacts negatively to the 
announcements of M&As with activity diversification. However, we have to 
remember that the universal banking principle that characterizes Europe implies that 
there are no stringent limits to product market diversification from commercial 
banking into investment banking and insurance. The US legislation during the period 
under study has been more restrictive both on cross ownership and cross selling 
between banking and insurance or investment firms. In this respect, the US 
diversification cannot be compared to the European one.  
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 With the aim of explaining the probability of abnormal returns occurrence, we 
further explore our data set by crossing variables. Due to the number of combined 
variables, a Probit estimation is used. 
 
IV. PROBIT ANALYSIS OF DEAL TYPE AND ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
We examine the link between the occurrence of abnormal returns for bank i 
on the event window and some features of the M&As. We estimate a standard Probit 
model: 
                                         Yi = α + 
J
j ji
j 1
X
=
β∑  + εi (9) 
where Yi is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the event (abnormal return) occurs 
or 0 if not and Xji is a characteristic feature of the transaction entered into by the bank 
i. Four binary explained variables are alternatively introduced according to: (1) the 
statistics TP1i or TNP1i (parametric or non-parametric) used to test the null; (2) the 
sign, positive or negative, of CARi: 
.  P_CAR_P = 1 if the parametric test TP1i establishes at least one positive and 
significant CARi event window among the twelve defined above (w1 to w12), and 0 
otherwise, 
.  P_CAR_N = 1 if the parametric test TP1i establishes at least one negative and 
significant CARi  event window among the twelve, 
.  NP_CAR_P = 1 if the non-parametric test TNP1i establishes at least one positive 
and significant CARi event window among the twelve, 
.  NP_CAR_N = 1 if the non-parametric test TNP1i establishes at least one negative 
and significant CARi  event window among the twelve. 
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The standard Probit model is estimated with a set of explanatory variables 
that handle with the previous characteristics of the M&As: 
1/ The status of the entity: BID = 1 if the bank is a bidder, 0 otherwise; TAR = 1 if 
the bank is a target, 0 otherwise,  
2/ The geographical dimension: GEOD = 1 if M&As involve a geographical 
diversification, 0 otherwise; GEOF = 1 if M&As imply a geographic focus, 0 
otherwise, 
3/  Specialisation or the cross-products diversification: SPEC = 1 if the operation 
involves an activity focusing, 0 otherwise; DIV = 1 if the operation involves a cross-
products diversification, 0 otherwise, 
 
and on an extended set of potentially explanatory variables: 
4/ If M&As involves cross product diversifying, it may be useful to state precisely the 
non banking operator’s activity: INS = 1 if the operation concerns a bank and an 
insurance service, 0 otherwise; SEC = 1 if the operation concerns a bank and a 
securities firm, 0 otherwise, 
5/ Composite dummies are built on the basis of the previous variables: the product 
DIV*GEOF allows for the specific influence of diversifying activities with 
geographic focusing on positive or negative CARi probability; in such a manner, a lot 
of composite dummies which cannot be listed here are constructed and added to the 
set of explanatory variables11, 
6/ The size control variable (SIZE) is defined as the ratio of market capitalisation of 
security i to the global market capitalisation at the event date.   
7/  Dummy variables are introduced to look for the presence of country effects. 
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The optimal subset of explanatory variables in Table 3 is selected through a 
standard stepwise procedure: after selecting a first explaining variable, the other ones 
are progressively introduced in the ajustment on the basis of a maximum t-stat 
criterium. Then, if the introduction of this additional variable induces the non 
significativity (at 5% traditionnal level) of an already present variable, this one is 
expelled from the ajustment. Significant variables are linked to the probability of 
having a positive or a negative abnormal return. These results complement those 
previously obtained in Table 2.  
Firstly, our finding suggests that positive CARi probability increases if bank i 
is a target. This result is consistent with the tests of Table 2 which show that a large 
share of our target sample presents a positive and significant abnormal return.  
Secondly, we were expecting a positive and significant coefficient for the 
deals with cross-product diversification and geographic specialisation. In fact, we 
find on average a positive abnormal return for these ones (see Table 2). The Probit 
estimation shows that the combination of activity diversification and geographic 
specialisation decreases the probability of having a negative abnormal return. Thus, 
this conjunction may reduce the probability to destroy value.  
Thirdly, we find also that the combination of the two criteria «target» and       
«geographic focusing» decreases the probability of having a negative abnormal 
return.  
Fourthly, according to the "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF) argument, governments 
would decide that major banks are so vital they are not allowed to fail. If this 
argument is true, these banks would have an incentive to increase their riskiness so as 
to take advantage of higher expected returns; therefore, the larger the institution, the 
higher should be the abnormal return upon the merger announcement. Our finding 
 14
doesn’t support the TBTF argument: the probability of having a positive abnormal 
return decreases with the size of the bank. This result is consistent with that of 
DeLong ([2001a], [2001b]). Fifthly, there are no country effects. The set of country 
dummies is not significant.  
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This study examines stock market reactions in terms of changes in expected 
returns to bank M&As that have been announced from 1991 to 2001 in 13 European 
countries. A Bivariate GARCH model, which relies on the joint density of individual 
and market returns, is used to construct abnormal returns. M&As were divided into 
several groups depending upon activity and geographic specialisation or 
diversification.  
 Our results show that there is, on average, a positive and significant increase 
in value for target banks. Moreover, we find that the market distinguishes among 
various types of M&As. On average there is a positive and significant market 
reaction for the two following type of transactions: cross-product diversification and 
geographic specialisation. On the contrary, M&As with focused activity and 
geographic diversification did not gain a positive market’s expectation. A Probit 
estimation is used to further explore our dataset by crossing the criteria of M&As 
classification. From this we find that the combination of activity diversification and 
geographic specialisation decreases the probability of having a negative abnormal 
return.  
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1. This figure represents complete M&As with majority interests. 
2. An event study is an analysis of whether there was a statistically significant reaction in 
financial markets to past occurrences of a given type of event that is hypothesised to affect 
public firms' market values.  
3.  For example, the deal between General de Banque SA (Belgium commercial bank) and 
Fortis AG (Belgium insurance company) in 1998 is classified as a M&A with cross-product 
diversification and geographic specialisation. On the contrary, the deal between Dresdner 
Bank (German commercial bank) and Kleinwort Benson Iberfomento (Spanish commercial 
bank) in 1998 is classified as a M&A with geographic diversification and activity 
specialisation. 
4. See «Mergers and Acquisitions» – European Economy – Supplement A, Economic trends, 
n°5/6 – 2000. 
5. BIS, « Report on Consolidation in the financial sector », January 2001. 
6. The SDC-M&A database is based on an American classification of companies in all 
branches of industry (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)) and obeys to the US regulation 
requirements. SDC-M&A partitions the financial sector into three industries: the banking 
industry (banking), the insurance industry (insurance) and investment businesses and 
financial companies (securities and others). In order to homogenise our study, we selected the 
banking firms as they were reported by SDC that is, the general classification «Commercial 
Banks, Bank Holding Companies» and, more particularly, the following codification: code 
6000 (Bank, non US-chartered) and code 6029 (Commercial Bank, net). 
7. We considered in this group the transactions between a bank (code 6000 and 6029) and a 
securities firm or an insurance firm at the domestic level only. 
8. Notice that T = D – J – 1. 
9. For windows w1 to w4, we get : M = J, U = D – 1 ; for w5 to w8, we get : M = J+1 and           
U = D+J ; for w9  to w12, we have : M = 2J + 1 and U = D+J. 
10. We carry out tests for all the windows defined above. In order to simplify the 
presentation, we present here the results for two windows. However, the results obtain for the 
windows [-7, +7] and [-15. +15] are robust for all the other ones. Thus tests in Table 2 are 
representative for all the windows considered. Other tests are available from the authors.  
11. TAR*INS for example, indicates a deal where the bank is a target and where the bidder is 
an insurance company. 
 
Table 1. M&As deals by country 
 DIV&GEOF SPEC&GEOF DIV&GEOD SPEC&GEOD Total 
Germany 9 5 6 1 21
Austria 1 2 1 0 4
belgium 1 3 1 1 6
Denmark 1 0 1 0 2
Spain 2 4 1 0 7
France 17 9 7 1 34
Greece 0 4 0 0 4
Ireland 0 0 2 0 2
Italy 17 27 0 0 44
Netherlands 0 1 3 1 5
Portugal 1 3 2 0 6
Switzreland 6 8 4 0 18
UK 19 2 3 3 27
Total 74 68 31 7 180
Source: SDC – M&A DIV = activity diversification; GEOF=geographic focusing; SPEC = activity 
specialisation; GEOD = geographic diversification. 
 
Table 2. Significance of abnormal returns 
     
Sample Event 
window 
T2 value Number of  significant 
TP1 
Number of  significant 
TNP1 
   Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Full sample [-7, +7] 2.412* 13 2 12 3 
N = 180 [-15, +15] 2.624* 9 2 7 3 
Target   [-7, +7] 1.995* 7 1 3 1 
N = 29   [-15, +15] 1.973* 4 0 3 1 
       
Bidder   [-7, +7] 1.567 6 1 9 2 
N = 151   [-15, +15] 1.887 5 2 4 2 
[-7, +7] 
[-15, +15]
0.26 
-0.374 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
      
Deals with geographic 
diversification 
N = 38 
 
Deals with geographic 
specialisation 
N = 142 
[-7, +7] 
[-15, +15]
2.491* 
3.067* 
13 
9 
2 
2 
11 
6 
3 
3 
Deals with activity   [-7, +7] 2.058* 6 0 7 0 
diversification   [-15, +15] 2.672* 6 0 4 0 
N = 105       
       
Deals with activity   [-7, +7] 1.423 7 2 5 3 
specialisation   [-15, +15] 1.225 3 2 3 3 
N = 75    
* significant at the 5% level 
Table 3. Explaining the probability of Cumulated Abnormal Return a 
Parametric statistic based binary explained variable  
Variable P(obtain a positive CARi) 
P_CAR_P 
 Variable P(obtain a negative CARi) 
P_CAR_N 
 'βˆ  z-stat (Prob)   'βˆ  z-stat (Prob) 
TAR  
 
0.647 2.490* 
(0.013)  
DIV*GEOF - 0.971 - 2.901** 
(0.004) 
Non-parametric statistic based binary explained variable  
Variable P(obtain a positive CARi) 
NP_CAR_P 
 Variable P(obtain a negative CARi) 
NP_CAR_N 
Variable P(obtain a positive CARi)  Variable P(obtain a negative CARi) 
 'βˆ  z-stat (Prob)   'βˆ  z-stat (Prob) 
SIZE - 0.135  
  
- 2.133* 
(0.033)  
TAR*GEOF - 0.703 -2.061* 
(0.039) 
a: Potential explanatory variables are: TAR, GEOD, DIV, SIZE, ASS, SEC, DIV*GEOD ,SPEC*GEOF,  
DIV*GEOD, SPEC*GEOF, TAR*GEOD, TAR*GEOF, TAR*DIV, TAR*SPEC, TAR*GEOF*DIV, 
TAR*GEOF*SPEC, TAR*GEOD*DIV, TAR*GEOD*SPEC, TAR*INS, TAR*SEC, and the country dummies The 
composite dummies with BID are not introduced because BID is not significant in the estimation with only the 
elementary variables.. * represents significance at the 5% level and ** represents significance at the 1% level.  
 
